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Abstract—In a bandwidth-flooding attack, compromised
sources send high-volume traffic to the target with the purpose of
causing congestion in its tail circuit and disrupting its legitimate
communications. In this paper, we present Active Internet Traffic
Filtering (AITF), a network-layer defense mechanism against
such attacks. AITF enables a receiver to contact misbehaving
sources and ask them to stop sending it traffic; each source
that has been asked to stop is policed by its own Internet
service provider (ISP), which ensures its compliance. An ISP that
hosts misbehaving sources either supports AITF (and accepts
to police its misbehaving clients), or risks losing all access to
the complaining receiver—this is a strong incentive to cooperate,
especially when the receiver is a popular public-access site. We
show that AITF preserves a significant fraction of a receiver’s
bandwidth in the face of bandwidth flooding, and does so at a
per-client cost that is already affordable for today’s ISPs; this
per-client cost is not expected to increase, as long as botnet-
size growth does not outpace Moore’s law. We also show that
even the first two networks that deploy AITF can maintain their
connectivity to each other in the face of bandwidth flooding. We
conclude that the network-layer of the Internet can provide an
effective, scalable, and incrementally deployable solution against
bandwidth-flooding attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a distributed bandwidth-flooding attack, a large number
of compromised sources send high-volume traffic to the target
in order to create congestion and packet loss in its tail circuit;
as a result, the target’s communication to legitimate sources
deteriorates. It has been shown that such attacks can exploit
the behavior of legitimate TCP sources (which back off in the
face of packet loss) to dramatically reduce their throughput or,
in the case of long-lived flows, drive it to zero [1].
Real-life reports complement such analysis: The first well-
documented incident we are aware of is the 2001 attack against
the Gibson Research Corporation (GRC) web site. To block
the flood, GRC analyzed the undesired traffic, determined its
sources, and asked from their Internet service provider (ISP) to
manually install filters that blocked traffic from these sources;
in the meantime, their site was unreachable for more than
30 hours [2]. More recent attacks are less well documented
(the victims are increasingly unwilling to reveal the details),
but hint that botnet sizes have increased beyond thousands
of sources, while undesired traffic is harder to identify—an
article on a 2003 attack against an online betting site reports
that the undesired traffic came from more than 20 000 sources,
its rate ranged from 1.5 to 3 Gbps, and it was addressed at
routers, DNS servers, mail servers, and web sites [3]. Despite
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the magnitude of the problem and the indications that it is
getting worse, no effective solution has been deployed yet.
There are two basic steps in stopping a bandwidth-flooding
attack: (1) identifying undesired traffic and (2) blocking it;
this paper addresses the latter. To prevent undesired traffic
from causing legitimate-traffic loss, it must be blocked before
entering the target’s tail circuit, for example, inside the target’s
ISP. The first solution that comes to mind is to automate the
approach followed by GRC: one can imagine an ISP service,
in which a flooding target sends filtering requests to its ISP,
and, in response, the ISP installs wire-speed filters (i.e., filters
that do not affect packet-forwarding performance) in its routers
to satisfy these requests; each filtering request specifies traffic
from one undesired-traffic source to the target.
The problem with this approach is that it requires more
resources than ISPs can afford: Wire-speed filters in routers
are a scarce resource, and this is not expected to change in
the near future. Modern hardware routers forward packets
at high rates that allow only few lookups per forwarded
packet; to reduce the number of per-packet lookups, router
manufacturers store filters—as well as any state that must be
looked up per packet, e.g., the router’s forwarding table—in
TCAM (ternary content addressable memory), which allows
for parallel accesses. However, because of its special features,
TCAM is more expensive and consumes more space and
power [4] than conventional memory; as a result, a router
linecard or supervisor-engine card typically supports a single
TCAM chip with tens of thousands of entries. For example,
at the time of writing, the Catalyst 4500, a mid-range switch,
provides a 64 000-entry TCAM to be shared among all its
interfaces (from 48 to 384 100-Mbps interfaces); Cisco 12 000,
a high-end router used at the Internet core, provides 20 000
entries that operate at line-speed per linecard (each linecard
has up to 4 1-Gbps interfaces). So, depending on how an ISP
connects its clients to its network, each client can typically
claim from a few hundred to a few thousand filters—not
enough to block the attacks observed today and not nearly
enough to block the attacks expected in the near future [5].
One could argue that, if an ISP does not have enough filters
to block traffic from each undesired-traffic source to each
targeted client, it can aggregate filtering rules, i.e., use one
filter to block traffic from multiple sources. The problem is that
such filter aggregation can lead to collateral damage: imagine
a scenario where 1000 AOL clients flood a public-access site
and, in response, the target’s ISP blocks all traffic from AOL to
the target, including traffic from AOL’s legitimate clients; such
a measure that sacrifices a significant portion of the target’s
legitimate traffic can be more damaging to the target’s business
than the attack itself.
2If an ISP does not have enough filters to block undesired
traffic to its clients, it can appeal to other ISPs—a distributed
attack coming from hundreds of domains necessarily involves
hundreds of routers, which means that millions of filters are
available to help block undesired traffic. However, any filtering
mechanism that involves inter-ISP cooperation faces two major
challenges. The first one is securing the mechanism itself
against attacks: once an ISP starts accepting filtering requests
to block traffic against alleged flooding targets, a malicious
entity can pose as the ISP of a flooding target and send filtering
requests to disrupt communication between end hosts or even
ISPs. The second challenge is motivating other ISPs to help:
without an incentive, an ISP is unlikely to spend its resources
helping some flooding target located in a foreign domain.
In this paper, we present Active Internet Traffic Filtering
(AITF), a network-layer filtering mechanism that enables a
receiver to explicitly deny tail-circuit access to misbehaving
sources, while addressing these challenges. We show that:
• AITF enables a receiver to preserve on average more than
80% of its tail circuit in the face of a SYN-flooding attack
that exceeds the target’s tail-circuit capacity by a factor
of 10 (§V).
• AITF requires an amount of per-client resources afford-
able for today’s ISPs; the cost of these resources is not
expected to increase with time, as long as botnet-size
growth does not outpace Moore’s law (§VI).
• AITF does not require any pre-configured inter-ISP re-
lationships or any public-key infrastructure; it is incre-
mentally deployable, in the sense that even the first two
ISPs that deploy it can maintain their connectivity to each
other in the face of bandwidth flooding (§IV).
We conclude that the network layer of the Internet can provide
an effective, scalable, and incrementally deployable solution
against bandwidth-flooding attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: After stating
our assumptions (§II), we describe AITF in two steps: first the
core of the protocol (§III), then certain extensions that shield
it against non-cooperative or malicious behavior (§IV). Then
we evaluate AITF: we compute its effectiveness in protecting
receivers (§V) and the resources required by participating
providers (§VI), then demonstrate our results through simu-
lation (§VII). Finally, we discuss limitations and open issues
(§VIII), present related work (§IX), and conclude (§X).
II. ASSUMPTIONS
To block undesired traffic, we assume that receivers have
the capability to identify it, while routers have the capability
to filter it. We now justify these assumptions, some of which
already hold in the current Internet, while others can be
satisfied through existing research proposals.
1) Path Identification: We define the domain-level path
of a received packet as the sequence of border routers that
forwarded the packet; a border router is a router that intercon-
nects different administrative domains. We assume that there
exists a (not necessarily globally deployed) path-identification
mechanism that enables participating domains to associate the
packets they forward with some form of identity, such that
the receiver of a packet can combine these identities and
reconstruct part of the packet’s domain-level path. E.g., in an
early deployment scenario, as in Fig. 1, where only SNET and
RNET have deployed path identification, the receiver R can
identify {Sgw Rgw} as part of the domain-level path.
Researchers have already proposed ways to provide path
identification via record route, i.e., by enabling routers to mark
forwarded packets, such that a packet’s path is specified inside
its headers: NIRA [6], WRAP [7], and the Points of Control
approach [8] all provide sufficient path identification for AITF.
Whatever the underlying record-route mechanism, we do not
assume that it is globally deployed; the only domains that have
to deploy it are the ones that also deploy AITF.
2) Undesired-traffic Identification: We define a packet flow
as a sequence of packets with a common source IP address,
domain-level path specification, and destination IP address;
we use notation {source domain_level_path destination} to
specify a flow. For instance, in Fig. 1, traffic with source
IP address S, domain-level path specification {Sgw Rgw},
and destination IP address R constitutes a flow, denoted by
{S Sgw Rgw R}. We assume that a receiver can run an
“undesired-flow identification system,” which takes as input
incoming traffic and outputs specifications of undesired flows;
a flow is classified as undesired once the receiver decides
it does not want to receive it for a certain amount of time.
We base this assumption on the fact that existing technology
already identifies undesired flows in terms of their source
and destination prefixes (and potentially other header fields in
use today) [9], [10]; once the domain-level path is specified
inside a packet’s headers, it should be possible to extend this
technology to take it into account.
3) Path-based Wire-speed Filtering: We assume that a
router that runs the AITF protocol (which, as we will see,
is necessarily a border router) can install a wire-speed filter
that blocks all traffic matching a certain flow specification. We
base this assumption on the fact that modern routers already
use wire-speed filters to block packets based on their IP and
transport-layer headers; once the domain-level path is specified
inside a packet’s headers, it should be possible to use the same
technology to filter the packet based on its domain-level path.
4) Provider-client Message Authentication: We assume that
a provider can verify the authenticity of messages sent from
its own clients, and a client can verify the authenticity of
messages sent from its own provider. This can be achieved
with message authentication codes or three-way handshakes.
5) Non-compromised Path: We assume that, in order for a
source-receiver pair to be able to communicate, the network
elements (typically routers) that are on the path between
them must not be compromised. Our rationale is that, once
a router gets compromised, all the communications served by
it are at its mercy: the router can drop their traffic or hijack
their TCP connections. Of course, if a source-receiver pair
can communicate over multiple paths, and at least one of
them is not compromised, they should be able to maintain
their communication—akin to how multi-path communication
between access points and clients increases attack resilience
in the Stateless Multipath Overlays approach [11]. Combining
multi-path with AITF is part of our future work.
3Fig. 1. Source S sends undesired traffic to receiver R through routers
Sgw (in S’s domain) and Rgw (in R’s domain). SNET and RNET have
deployed AITF (and the underlying path-identification mechanism).
R identifies {S Sgw Rgw R} as an undesired flow.
III. THE BASIC AITF PROTOCOL
We now describe the basic elements of the Active Internet
Traffic Filtering (AITF) protocol. For simplicity, we initially
assume all domains that deploy AITF to be honest and well
behaved, then relax these assumptions in §IV.
A. Players
AITF involves four players per undesired flow, illustrated
in Fig. 1:
• The receiver R is the target of the undesired flow.
• The source S is the node generating the undesired flow.
• The receiver’s gateway Rgw is a border router located
in R’s ISP, on the path from S to R, before R’s tail
circuit. Note that Rgw is not significantly affected by
the attack; if it were (i.e., if its own tail circuit were
congested), Rgw itself would be the “receiver,” while the
role of the receiver’s gateway would be played by another
router upstream.
• The source gateway Sgw is a border router located in S’s
ISP, on the path from S to R.
These four players communicate through AITF messages,
which include one or more filtering requests. Each filtering
request includes the specification of an undesired flow F and
the amount of time Wf (called the filtering window) for which
the requester does not want to receive F .
For simplicity, we make three temporary assumptions that
we relax in §IV:
1) The source gateway Sgw cooperates with the receiver’s
gateway Rgw to help the receiver.
2) Filtering requests are not malicious, i.e., they indeed
originate from the specified undesired-traffic receiver R and
correspond to traffic indeed sent from the specified source S.
3) The receiver can trust the path specified inside each
received packet, i.e., it knows the true source S and the true
source gateway Sgw for each undesired flow.
B. Algorithm Overview
Once a receiver R identifies an undesired flow F , it contacts
the corresponding source S and asks it to stop sending F for
an amount of time Wf . R’s request is propagated through Rgw
and Sgw , which temporarily block F to immediately protect R
until S complies. The parameters of the protocol are defined
in Table I.
More specifically, R sends a filtering request to its gateway
Rgw to block F for Wf . In response, Rgw installs a temporary
filter that blocks F for time Tdr ≪ Wf and forwards the
request to the source gateway Sgw ; once Sgw satisfies the
request, Rgw removes its temporary filter. Similarly, Sgw
installs a temporary filter that blocks F for time Tds ≪Wf ,
logs the request for Wf , and forwards the request to S; once
S satisfies the request, Sgw removes its temporary filter.
If S does not cooperate (i.e., continues to send F ), Sgw
classifies S as non-cooperating and blocks all S-originated
traffic. If S “pretends” to cooperate (i.e., stops sending F , but
resumes before Wf has elapsed), the following takes place: R
sends a second filtering request against S; upon receiving this
second request, Sgw checks its log, detects that S has already
been told to stop sending F , classifies S as non-cooperating,
and blocks all S-originated traffic.
C. Details and Rationale
We now discuss and justify the three key elements of the
algorithm outlined above.
1) Temporary Filters: AITF-enabled routers install wire-
speed filters only temporarily, in order to allow for efficient
filter reuse: The receiver’s gateway installs a filter to selec-
tively block each undesired flow for Tdr ≪ Wf ; once the
source gateway has taken over filtering this flow, the receiver’s
gateway can reuse its filter to satisfy another filtering request.
Similarly, the source gateway installs a filter to selectively
block each undesired flow for Tds ≪ Wf ; once the source
stops sending the flow, the source gateway can reuse its
filter to satisfy another filtering request. Of course, the source
gateway must still keep a log on each filtering request for
Wf , in order to ensure that the corresponding source is
cooperating. However, keeping a log on a filtering request for
tens of minutes is significantly less expensive than filtering the
corresponding undesired flow for the same amount of time;
this is because filters are stored in TCAM, whereas logs can
be stored in conventional DRAM, accessed off the router’s
fast path. So, AITF does not reduce the amount of router state
necessary to block an undesired flow, but “moves” it off the
fast path, i.e., from an expensive, physically-limited state store
to a commoditized one.
2) Selective vs Aggregate Filtering: A source gateway uses
two different ways to block a source’s undesired traffic: first,
it uses multiple selective temporary filters to block each
undesired flow; second, if the source is classified as non-
cooperating, the source gateway by default uses a single
aggregate long-term filter to block all its traffic, until the
source’s owner fixes the vulnerability that caused it to send
undesired traffic and contacts her provider. Selective filtering
preserves the source’s legitimate traffic, but requires one filter
per undesired flow; hence, it is reserved for well behaved
sources, which quickly cooperate, allowing the source gateway
to reuse its filters for other purposes. Aggregate filtering
requires a single filter, but sacrifices the source’s legitimate
traffic. We choose this, admittedly draconian, default policy
against non-cooperating sources, because it minimizes the
amount of filtering resources that a provider spends on mis-
behaving clients. However, a provider is free to implement
4Parameter Meaning Example value
Outbound filtering request rate (REQout ) Rgw honors this rate of filtering requests from R. 1000 req/sec
Inbound filtering request rate (REQin ) Sgw honors this rate of filtering requests against S. 1000 req/sec
Filtering window (Wf ) After Wf , S is allowed to send F traffic again. 10 minutes
Rgw deadline (Tdr ) Rgw expects Sgw to block F within Tdr from the moment it sends the filtering request to it. 1 sec
Sgw deadline (Tds ) Sgw expects S to stop F within Tds from the moment it sends the filtering request to it. 10 msec
TABLE I
THE PARAMETERS OF THE AITF PROTOCOL
more lenient per-client policies, where it blocks progressively
larger aggregates from a non-cooperating client (rather than
immediately block all its traffic), as long as it can afford the
necessary resources (we discuss this in §VIII-B).
3) Filtering Window: Each filtering request includes a
filtering window Wf , i.e., the amount of time for which the
specified undesired-traffic source is asked to stop sending
traffic to the receiver, which is on the order of minutes.
Choosing a value for Wf involves the following trade-off: The
larger Wf is, the longer each source is forced to stop sending
traffic to the receiver—otherwise, it gets all its traffic blocked.
However, undesired-traffic sources are typically infected hosts
that, once patched and brought back online, should be able to
send (legitimate) traffic to the receiver; the larger Wf is, the
longer each former undesired-traffic source must wait before
being able to send legitimate traffic to the receiver once it has
been patched. We show how Wf affects the effectiveness of
AITF in §V; we show how it affects its cost in §VI.
D. Controlling Resource Consumption
There are three knobs for controlling resource consumption:
1) The receiver’s gateway has the notion of a per-client out-
bound filtering request rate (REQout ), which is the maximum
rate of filtering requests from this client that Rgw honors; if the
client exceeds this rate, its requests get dropped. In this way,
a single undesired-traffic receiver cannot exhaust/monopolize
its provider’s resources.
2) The source gateway has the notion of a maximum filtering
window Wfmax : even if the filtering window specified in a
filtering request exceeds Wfmax , the source gateway logs the
filtering request only for Wfmax .
3) The source gateway also has the notion of a per-client
inbound filtering request rate (REQin ), which is the maximum
rate of filtering requests against this client that Sgw honors;
requests against the client beyond this rate are dropped.
E. Legacy Traffic
When the traffic addressed to an AITF receiver exceeds a
pre-configured threshold, the receiver’s gateway gives priority
to packets carrying path information; in this way, undesired
legacy traffic can only affect other legacy traffic, but not the
traffic coming from other AITF-enabled domains.
IV. OPERATION IN NON-COOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENTS
In a non-cooperative environment, the three assumptions
made in §III-A do not always hold, namely, source gateways
may not cooperate, filtering requests may be malicious, and
path specifications may be spoofed. We now remove these
assumptions and show how AITF operates in non-cooperative,
potentially malicious environments.
A. Non-cooperating Source Gateways
A source gateway may not cooperate for three reasons:
first, it may not have the resources to satisfy every filtering
request; second, it may be compromised and controlled by
the same attacker that controls the undesired-traffic source(s);
third, and most important, a provider has no incentive to block
traffic from (and potentially dissatisfy) its own clients, even if
they are misbehaving, in order to help some complaining host
located in a foreign administrative domain.
To deal with non-cooperating source gateways, AITF offers
the option of escalation: a receiver R can ask its gateway to
block all traffic from a non-cooperating source gateway Sgw
to R. Hence, a source gateway either cooperates and blocks
undesired traffic from its misbehaving clients or risks losing
all connectivity to the complaining receiver.
In a full-deployment scenario, R escalates by sending out
a filtering request that specifies all traffic from Sgw as the
undesired flow and the next border router on the path from Sgw
to R as the source gateway—i.e., the non-cooperating source
gateway becomes an undesired-traffic source, while the role of
the source gateway is now played by another border router. In
an early deployment scenario, where the only AITF-enabled
routers are Sgw and Rgw , this is not an option; in this case, R
sends out filtering requests against Sgw every Tdr , such that
all traffic from Sgw to R remains blocked at Rgw .
Escalation is reminiscent of aggregate filtering of a misbe-
having source’s traffic: using multiple selective filters to block
each undesired flow from a non-cooperating source gateway
would be too expensive; instead, the receiver’s gateway uses
a single aggregate filter to block all traffic from the source
gateway to the receiver. We choose this as the default policy
toward non-cooperating source gateways, because it minimizes
the amount of filtering resources that a receiver consumes
due to non-cooperating networks that refuse to deal with their
misbehaving clients. Of course, a receiver is free to implement
more lenient policies, as long as it can afford the necessary
resources (we discuss this in §VIII-B).
B. Malicious Filtering Requests
A filtering request has three possible outcomes: all traffic
from the source S to the receiver R is blocked; all traffic from
the source S is blocked; or, all traffic from the source gateway
Sgw to R is blocked (if Sgw does not cooperate). Hence, there
are three ways in which a malicious node M may try to abuse
filtering requests to disrupt legitimate communications:
• It may try to disconnect a source S from a receiver R:
pretend to be R’s gateway and ask from S to stop sending
it traffic.
5Fig. 2. AITF message exchange: The receiver R sends a filtering
request to its gateway Rgw , specifying an undesired flow F ; Rgw
propagates the request to the source gateway Sgw ; Sgw responds
with a proof request sent to R that includes the undesired-flow
specification and a cookie C; Rgw intercepts the proof request and
generates a proof response with the undesired-flow specification and
the same cookie C; Sgw receives the proof response, verifies that it
includes a valid cookie, and propagates the filtering request to the
undesired-traffic source S.
• It may try to disconnect a source S from its network:
send bogus filtering requests against S, so that S is
misclassified as non-cooperating and blocked.
• It may try to disconnect a source gateway Sgw from
its receivers: send it lots of bogus filtering requests, so
that Sgw cannot respond to legitimate requests by honest
receivers and loses access to these receivers.
Next, we describe how AITF prevents each type of abuse.
1) Verifying the Origin of Filtering Requests: The source
and receiver’s gateways perform a three-way handshake, illus-
trated in Fig. 2: when receiver gateway Rgw sends a filtering
request to source gateway Sgw , the latter responds with a proof
request, addressed to the alleged receiver R; by intercepting
this proof request and sending it back (as a proof response) to
Sgw , Rgw proves that it is indeed on the path to R.
To prevent a malicious node M that is not on the path from
Rgw to Sgw from guessing the contents of the proof request,
Sgw includes in it a cookie, which is computed as follows:
cookie = hashck (R)
where hash is a one-way keyed hash function, ck is a
periodically regenerated secret known only to Sgw , and R
is the IP address of the alleged receiver. The cryptographic
properties of the hash function guarantee the following: first,
M cannot practically guess the cookie included in the request,
unless it knows the secret ck ; second, a node that is on the path
of a certain proof request and observes the included cookie
cannot practically compute from it the value of the secret
or of cookies that correspond to other receivers. Note that
this stateless-handshake approach protects Sgw from filtering-
request floods the same way TCP SYN cookies protect servers
from SYN floods [12].
2) Verifying Non-cooperation Claims: Before classifying a
source S as non-cooperating, its gateway Sgw first monitors
S’s traffic to verify that it is indeed misbehaving; by “monitor-
ing” we mean that Sgw keeps a record of the destinations S has
sent traffic to within a certain period of time Wm (called the
monitoring window), which is on the order of a few seconds.
Whenever a new filtering request arrives against S, Sgw checks
its record; if the request does not concern traffic sent by S
within the last monitoring window, it is dropped. As a result,
S is never misclassified and blocked due to a false claim.
To allow the source gateway to verify non-cooperation
claims in this manner, each receiver gives it two chances to co-
operate: Suppose receiver R has sent a filtering request against
undesired flow F generated by source S. If F reappears before
Wf has elapsed, R sends a second filtering request against it;
in response, Sgw starts monitoring traffic from S. If F appears
for a third time, R sends a third filtering request against it;
now Sgw can check its monitoring log, verify that S is not
cooperating, and block all its traffic. In the worst-case scenario,
Sgw does not cooperate and F appears for a fourth time; as a
result, R escalates and blocks all traffic from Sgw .
3) Taming Filtering-request Floods: The same technique is
used to prevent a set of compromised nodes from exhausting
a source gateway’s resources with bogus filtering requests (in-
cluding non-cooperation claims): whenever a source gateway
receives an unusually high rate of requests from an alleged
receiver’s gateway, it starts monitoring traffic to that gateway;
if it turns out that its requests are bogus (i.e., do not correspond
to traffic actually sent to it during the last monitoring window),
the receiver’s gateway is classified as “malfunctioning” and
all its filtering requests are dropped. An honest receiver’s
gateway can prevent its clients from causing it to be classified
as malfunctioning by regulating the rate of outbound filtering
requests per targeted source gateway.
C. Spoofed Addresses and Paths
The path specified inside a received packet may not corre-
spond to the actual path followed by the packet because of
source-address or path spoofing.
1) Source-address Spoofing: AITF does not detect source-
address spoofing nor handle it specially. If the source specified
in an undesired flow is S, the corresponding source gateway is
asked to block all traffic from S to the receiver, even if S is not
the true identity of the undesired-traffic source. A malicious
node can abuse this to disrupt communications between a
receiver and a source located behind the same gateway with
the malicious node. It is up to the provider of the malicious
node to detect this activity or prevent it by taking anti-spoofing
measures. I.e., if a provider hosts potential undesired-traffic
sources, it is in the provider’s best interest to prevent source-
address spoofing within its network, in order to protect its own
clients from each other.
2) Path Spoofing: Consider a partial deployment scenario,
where two AITF-enabled domains are interconnected through
legacy domains, as in Fig. 1. In this case, a malicious node
located in a legacy domain can generate packets that appear
to be coming from SNET and are addressed to R. As a result,
SNET is asked to block traffic it does not generate; if it just
drops the request, R misclassifies SNET as non-cooperating
and potentially blocks all its traffic.
We can prevent such abuse in the following way: Each
source gateway Sgw can (1) mark outgoing packets with a
6stamp that depends on the packet’s destination domain and
(2) communicate that stamp to the corresponding receiver’s
gateway Rgw ; the latter can then drop all incoming traffic
that claims to be coming from Sgw but has an invalid stamp.
Such packet stamping can be initiated by Sgw , in response to
filtering requests against traffic that it never sent; in this case,
Sgw piggy-backs the stamp on the corresponding three-way
handshake. Alternatively, Rgw can preventively ask for packet
stamping from all its source gateways, before any attack takes
place; in this case, it pays the cost of more incoming traffic
(because all packets are augmented with a stamp), but drops
all spoofed traffic, making it easier for its clients to identify
undesired flows.
To prevent a malicious node M that is not on the path from
Sgw to certain destination from guessing the corresponding
stamp1, Sgw computes stamps as follows:
stamp = hashsk (dst_prefix )
where hash is a one-way keyed hash function, sk is a period-
ically regenerated secret known only to Sgw , and dst_prefix
is the destination prefix of the packet. The cryptographic
properties of the hash function guarantee the following: First,
M cannot practically guess the stamp included in a packet,
unless it knows the secret sk . Second, a node that is on the path
of a certain packet and observes the included stamp cannot
practically compute from it the value of the secret or of stamps
that correspond to other destination domains.
D. Summary
To deal with non-cooperating gateways, AITF offers the
option of escalation: ISPs that host attack sources either co-
operate and police their misbehaving clients, or risk losing all
access to the complaining receiver(s). The origin of a filtering
request is verified through a three-way handshake between the
two involved networks, while the claim of a filtering request is
verified by monitoring the alleged source. Finally, to prevent
path spoofing, source networks mark outgoing packets with
hard-to-guess, destination-dependent stamps.
V. EFFECTIVENESS
In this section, we describe the different flooding strategies
that can be used against an AITF-enabled receiver, then
compute an upper bound on the damage each strategy can
inflict on the receiver’s tail circuit. We omit the straightforward
proofs and justify these bounds intuitively; for more details,
we refer the reader to [13].
A. Attack Model
Each attack consists of a certain number of undesired flows
Nuf ; each undesired flow corresponds to one source. Different
sources may send at different rates, but, for simplicity, we
1In [13] we compute the probability of an off-path attacker guessing the
stamp as a function of its size. As an example, in the current Internet, a
128-bit stamp could be guessed with probability 1.3 · 10−25, while it would
introduce roughly 4% bandwidth overhead.
assume that each source i sends at one rate ri .2 The highest
rate of undesired traffic arrives at the receiver’s tail circuit
when all sources send at the same time; we call this the
aggregate undesired-traffic rate and it is equal to Rut = Σ∀iri ,
i ∈ [0,Nuf ). This model corresponds to an attack in which the
botnet master turns different bots on and off, but does not vary
the rate at which each bot sends when it is on.
The receiver identifies undesired flow i after receiving biid
bits from it. Hence, the total number of unidentified bits
that the receiver gets before identifying all undesired flows
is Bid = Σ∀ibiid , i ∈ [0,Nuf ); we call this the identification
overhead. The receiver uses the same filtering window Wf
in all filtering requests it sends throughout the attack; Wf is
larger than the amount of time it takes to receive Bid bits.
A source S can inflict different types and amounts of
damage to the receiver R’s tail circuit depending on how it
behaves when asked to stop sending undesired flow F . Ideally,
S stops sending F and never resumes—we do not discuss this
further, as it is the best case for our mechanism. We distinguish
three other cases:
• Deaf sources ignore filtering requests and are immedi-
ately identified and blocked.
• Lying sources stop sending undesired traffic when so
requested, but resume after the corresponding source
gateway has removed its temporary filter, before Wf has
elapsed. As a result, they manage to send multiple rounds
of traffic before they are identified and blocked.
• On-off sources cooperate with filtering requests, but
resume sending undesired traffic after the requests have
expired. As a result, they avoid punishment, yet force the
receiver to re-detect their undesired traffic and send new
filtering requests against them every filtering window.
To describe the short- and long-term damage inflicted by
these flooding strategies, we use the following metrics:
• The initial overhead is the number of undesired bits re-
ceived until all undesired flows are identified and blocked
for the first time.
• The tail-circuit capacity loss is the fraction of the re-
ceiver’s tail circuit that is consumed by undesired traffic
throughout the attack, computed at the granularity of a
filtering window.
We express our results in terms of the AITF parameters defined
in Table I and the receiver and attack parameters defined in
Table II.
B. Result Summary
The initial overhead inflicted by deaf sources is bounded
according to Eq. 1; this gives the maximum number of un-
desired bits received until the receiver identifies all undesired
flows and sends a filtering request against each one, and until
these requests take effect.
Lying sources can inflict a bigger initial overhead, bounded
according to Eq. 2, at the cost of having all their traffic
2The model could be easily adjusted to capture the case where each source
sends at more than one rate, if we break the traffic sent by each source into
multiple flows in such a way that each flow has only one possible rate.
7Metric Description Units
Tail-circuit capacity (Ctc) The capacity of the bottleneck link between the receiver and its gateway. bps
Tail-circuit RTT (RTTtc) The round-trip time between the receiver and its gateway. seconds
Aggregate undesired-traffic rate (Rut ) The maximum rate at which undesired traffic arrives at the receiver’s tail circuit. bps
Average undesired-flow rate (r¯i ) The average rate at which each undesired flow arrives at the receiver’s tail circuit. bps
Aggregate identification overhead (Bid ) The total number of unidentified bits that the receiver must get before identifying all undesired flows. bits
Identification time (Tid ) Tid = BidRut seconds
A measure of the amount of time it takes to identify an undesired flow.
It corresponds to the average identification overhead divided by the average undesired flow rate.
Number of undesired flows (Nuf ) The total number of different undesired flows sent to the receiver during the attack.
Each undesired flow corresponds to a single source.
Request time (Treq ) Treq = NufREQout The amount of time it takes to send filtering requests against all undesired flows. seconds
TABLE II
PARAMETERS USED TO QUANTIFY AITF EFFECTIVENESS
blocked. The factor of 4 in Eq. 2 captures the fact that lying
sources force the receiver to send multiple (up to four) filtering
requests in order to block each undesired flow.
On-off sources inflict the same maximum initial overhead
with deaf sources. Moreover, they periodically resume their
attack and, hence, re-inflict up to the same overhead during
each filtering window; the resulting tail-circuit capacity loss
is bounded according to Eq. 4.
To give some concrete numbers, consider a receiver with
tail-circuit capacity Ctc = 100 Mbps, RTTtc a few millisec-
onds, filtering window Wf = 10 minutes, and outbound fil-
tering request rate REQout = 1000 requests/second. Suppose
this site is under a SYN-flooding attack by Nuf = 100 000 on-
off sources; each source sends 10 Kbps, so undesired traffic
arrives at the site’s tail circuit at ten times its capacity, i.e.,
Rut = 1 Gbps. Suppose it takes 10 Kbits to identify each
undesired flow (roughly 20 SYN packets), so Tid = 1 second.
Given these numbers, λ ≤ 0.19, which means that the target
preserves on average more than 80% of its tail circuit in the
face of an attack that exceeds its capacity by a factor of ten.
C. Deaf and Lying Sources
Consider a host R receiving Nuf flows from deaf sources.
R incurs initial overhead
Bo ≤ Bid + CtcTreq + RutRTTtc (1)
The bound is derived by breaking down the impact of deaf
sources on the receiver’s tail circuit into three components:
The identification overhead (Bid ) consists of undesired traffic
received before the corresponding flows are identified as un-
desired. The request overhead (CtcTreq ) consists of identified
undesired traffic received before R sends filtering requests
against the corresponding flows: it takes Treq = NufREQout
seconds for R to send filtering requests against all Nuf flows;
the maximum number of bits that R can receive within
this interval is CtcTreq . The blocking overhead (RutRTTtc)
consists of identified undesired traffic received after R has sent
filtering requests against the corresponding flows.
Now consider a host R receiving Nuf flows from lying
sources. R incurs initial overhead
Bl ≤ Bid + 4(CtcTreq + RutRTTtc) (2)
The difference between deaf and lying sources is that the latter
manage to send undesired traffic up to four times before being
identified and blocked (see §IV-B2)—hence, R incurs up to
four times the maximum request and blocking overhead caused
by deaf sources.
Eq. 1 and 2 may overestimate initial overhead in two ways:
First, they assume that the receiver first identifies all flows
and then starts sending filtering requests against them; this
may not be the case, for instance, in a simple SYN-flooding
attack, where the receiver can identify flows and send filtering
requests in parallel. Second, the equations assume that the
receiver’s tail circuit is flooded until all undesired flows have
been blocked; this may not be the case, as there may not be
enough undesired flows to consume 100% of the receiver’s
tail circuit. So, the upper bounds of the two equations are
reached only in sophisticated attacks, where (1) the receiver
must first process all undesired flows before identifying them
and (2) there are enough undesired flows to consume all of
the receiver’s tail circuit until they are all blocked.
D. On-off Sources
The maximum number of on-off sources that an AITF-
enabled receiver can keep blocked is
Nfmax = REQout ·Wf (3)
The gist of the equation is that a receiver cannot block more
flows than can be blocked within a filtering window Wf :
once Wf elapses, previously blocked flows reappear, and the
receiver must spend its resources re-blocking these recurring
flows rather than block new ones. For instance, a receiver
with REQout = 1000 flows/second and Wf = 10 min cannot
handle more than 600 000 on-off sources.
Consider a host R receiving Nuf ≤ Nfmax flows from on-
off sources. R incurs initial overhead Bo , bounded according
to Eq. 1, and tail-circuit capacity loss
λ ≤
Rut
Ctc
·
Tid + RTTtc
Wf
+
Treq
Wf
(4)
The bound is derived by assuming that R receives Bo unde-
sired bits during every filtering window Wf .
The first term of Eq. 4 captures the identification and
blocking overhead, i.e., the fact that the receiver must identify
and block each undesired flow during every filtering window;
it depends on how the undesired-traffic rate (Rut ) compares
to the receiver’s tail-circuit capacity (Ctc), and how the
amount of time for which each undesired flow is received
8(Tid +RTTtc) compares to the amount of time for which it is
blocked (Wf ). The second term captures the request overhead,
i.e., the fact that the receiver must send filtering requests
against all undesired flows during every filtering window; it
depends on how the amount of time it takes to send filtering
requests (Treq ) compares to the amount of time for which
undesired flows are blocked (Wf ).
E. Limits
When the aggregate undesired-traffic rate Rut is so large
that the bound given by Eq. 4 exceeds 1, then the receiver’s
tail circuit is flooded despite AITF. For instance, consider
again the example of Section V-B, where a receiver with
tail-circuit capacity Ctc = 100 Mbps is under attack by
Nuf = 100 000 on-off sources. We said that, if Rut = 1
Gbps, AITF enables this receiver to preserve more than 80%
of its tail-circuit capacity. However, if the same receiver comes
under a Rut = 50-Gbps attack, then its tail circuit is flooded
despite AITF.
On the other hand, if an attack is sending 50 Gbps to
a certain site, it is most likely flooding not only the site’s
connection to its ISP, but also the ISP link that carries the
undesired traffic to the site—today, such an attack would
be enough to flood the Internet core. This means that the
“tail circuit” is not the site’s 100 Mbps connection, but the
congested ISP link (which most likely has a capacity of
hundreds of Mbps), and the “receiver” of the undesired traffic
is not the site, but the ISP router at the end of the congested
ISP link. So it is now up to the affected router to identify
undesired flows and send filtering requests against them.
VI. DEPLOYMENT COST
In this section, we look at AITF deployment cost. For com-
pleteness, we first discuss what it takes to identify undesired
traffic today—we do not provide a complete solution, merely
give a rough sense of the kind of tools and the amount of time
it requires (§VI-A). Then, we compute the amount of resources
required to deploy AITF today (§VI-B) and examine how their
cost is expected to evolve as the Internet grows (§VI-C).
A. Undesired-traffic Identification
Accurate identification requires anti-spoofing measures, so
the first question is whether spoofing is still an issue today.
Beverly and Bauer’s Spoofer project currently shows that close
to a fifth of Internet addresses and a quarter of Autonomous
Systems allow the corresponding hosts to spoof [14]. So,
even though we do not know to what extent bandwidth-
flooding sources use spoofing (victims do not typically release
such information), we do know that many of them can still
do it. Hence, a provider that chooses to offer its clients
the capability of quick identification (and, hence, blocking)
of undesired traffic, must pay the cost of preventive packet
stamping (§IV-C).
Next, we look at how a receiver can identify (non-spoofed)
undesired flows. We first consider a simple SYN-flooding at-
tack, where 100 000 sources flood the receiver’s 100 Mbps tail
circuit with SYN packets—we choose these values, because,
at the time of writing, botnet sizes are reported to be on the
order of tens of thousands, while a Web search for “unmetered
servers” shows that 100 Mbps is the state-of-the-art tail-circuit
capacity for online services. Suppose the receiver classifies
traffic from a source as an undesired flow, as soon as it has
received 20 SYN packets (about 10 Kbits) from the source.
In this case, the receiver needs 1 Gbit of undesired traffic to
identify all undesired flows; assuming legitimate TCP flows
consume a small fraction of the tail circuit and quickly back
off in the face of the attack, it takes about 10 seconds for the
receiver to identify all undesired flows.
An attacker can make things harder by emulating a flash
crowd, i.e., flood the receiver with legitimate-looking traffic,
such that the receiver cannot tell legitimate from undesired
flows. One way to deal with such an attack is to classify a flow
as undesired when it is not generated by a human user. Online
services already use reverse Turing tests to identify flows
that are not generated by humans; researchers have showed
how to use them to identify denial-of-service traffic: the
receiver responds to each SYN packet with a reverse-Turing
test challenge; traffic from sources that keep sending false
responses (or new SYN packets) is classified as undesired [15].
In this way, an attacker cannot use bots to emulate legitimate
behavior and can at best resort to a simple SYN-flooding attack
as described above.
B. A Sample Configuration and its Cost
Table III shows the number of per-client filters and the
amount of per-client memory that a provider needs to deploy
AITF as a function of its parameters. Note that the provider’s
routers act both as receiver’s and source gateways for its
clients, hence, the provider needs resources to satisfy both
outbound and inbound filtering requests.
To use the equations of Table III, we must first derive
a sample AITF configuration—if a provider deployed AITF
today, what would be reasonable values for the parameters of
Table I?
The receiver-gateway deadline (Tdr , the amount of time
for which the receiver’s gateway blocks each undesired flow
until the source gateway takes over) must be long enough to
accommodate the three-way handshake between the receiver’s
and the source gateway; given that, at the time of writing,
Internet round-trip times are on the order of hundreds of
milliseconds [16], a conservative value would be 1 second.
Similarly, the source-gateway deadline (Tds ) must be long
enough to accommodate a round-trip time between the source
gateway and the source; a conservative value for a modern
network would be 10 milliseconds.
The maximum outbound filtering-request rate (REQout )
that the receiver’s gateway accepts from a certain receiver is
bounded by the number of filters Fout that the provider can
devote to that receiver. In §I, we argued that, at the time of
writing, it is reasonable to assume from a few hundred to a few
thousand filters per client; for instance, if Fout = 1000 filters
and Tdr = 1 second, the provider can accept REQout = 1000
requests/second from the receiver (Table III). When source
9Resource Amount Usage Explanation
Filters Fout = REQout · Tdr Block unwanted traffic to the client. The corresponding receiver’s gateway accepts request rate REQout
from the client and blocks each specified flow for Tdr .
Fin = REQin · Tds Block unwanted traffic from the client. The corresponding source gateway accepts request rate REQin
against the client and blocks each specified flow for Tds .
DRAM slots L = REQin ·Wfmax Log filtering requests against the client. The corresponding source gateway accepts request rate REQin
against the client and logs each request for Wfmax .
TABLE III
PER-CLIENT RESOURCES REQUIRED BY AN AITF-ENABLED PROVIDER
gateways cooperate, this rate is enough to block traffic from
up to 600 000 sources (§V-D, Eq. 3). In the worst-case scenario
(none of the source gateways cooperate, and none of the
other border routers on the path support AITF), the receiver’s
gateway locally blocks traffic from each source gateway to the
receiver (§IV-A); in that case, a rate of 1000 requests/second
is enough to block traffic from 1000 source gateways.
When source gateways do not cooperate and the receiver
is not granted a large enough REQout to have traffic from
each one of them blocked, it must somehow choose the
“worst” source gateways to block. Chen et al. recently ob-
served that compromised sources tend to be clustered—in their
DShield.org trace, about 80% of the sources were concentrated
in the same 20% of the IP address space [17]. At the time of
writing, assuming one domain per Autonomous System (AS),
a rate of 6000 requests/second would be enough to block traffic
from about a fifth of Internet domains.
The maximum inbound filtering-request rate (REQin )
that the source gateway accepts against a certain source is
bounded by the number of filters Fin that the provider can
devote to this task; assuming Fin = 10 filters and Tds = 10
milliseconds, the provider can accept REQin = 1000 re-
quests/second against the source (Table III).
The filtering window (Wf ) must be long enough so that the
receiver has time to identify all the undesired flows and send
filtering requests against them before they start reappearing—
hence, the right value depends on the nature of the attack.
For instance, consider a SYN-flooding attack (like the one de-
scribed in §VI-A), where 100 000 sources generate 1 Gbps of
undesired traffic against the receiver’s 100 Mbps tail circuit: it
takes about 10 seconds for the receiver to identify all undesired
flows and, assuming REQout = 1000 requests/second, at most
another 10 seconds to send filtering requests against them; in
this case, a filtering window of Wf = 10 minutes preserves
more than 80% of the receiver’s tail circuit (§V-D, Eq. 4).
The filtering window determines the amount of memory
used at the source gateway to log incoming filtering requests;
assuming a maximum filtering window of Wfmax = 10
minutes and REQin = 1000 requests/second, a provider needs
enough memory to log L = 600 000 requests per client
(Table III); assuming about 20 bytes per request (enough
to fit the receiver and receiver-gateway’s addresses and a
timestamp), this corresponds to 12 MB of DRAM per client.
To summarize, our sample configuration requires a few
thousand filters and a few MB of DRAM per client; today, such
resources would be enough to protect a significant fraction of
each receiver’s tail circuit, even when undesired-traffic rate
exceeds its tail-circuit capacity by several factors.
C. Evolution of AITF Cost
AITF guarantees limited tail-circuit capacity loss in the face
of flooding attacks, as specified by Eq. 4, repeated here in an
equivalent form:
λ ≤
r¯i
Ctc
·
Nuf
Wf
· (Tid + RTTtc) +
Nuf
Wf
·
1
REQout
where all parameters are defined in Tables I and II. We now
examine what the receiver must do in order for this guarantee
to remain the same as the Internet grows.
Assuming Tid , RTTtc , and REQout remain stable, we
expect that: (1) r¯i (the average undesired-traffic rate per
source) will grow at the same rate with the average tail-circuit
capacity of Internet hosts; to keep λ stable, the receiver must
increase Ctc at the same rate with r¯i—i.e., the receiver’s tail-
circuit capacity must keep up with the average tail-circuit
capacity in the Internet. (2) Nuf (the number of undesired
flows per attack) will grow as botnet sizes increase; to keep
λ stable, the receiver must increase Wf at the same rate
with Nuf —i.e., as the number of undesired flows grows, each
individual flow must be blocked for a longer period of time.
According to Table III, if receivers increase their filtering
windows, the amount of per-client DRAM required to log fil-
tering requests will increase accordingly—the intuition is that,
as filtering windows grow, a provider that hosts undesired-
traffic sources must be able to remember each undesired flow
for a longer period of time, which means that it needs more
memory for logging filtering requests. Hence, the amount of
per-client DRAM must increase at the same rate with the
number of bots attacking the receiver. This means that the
evolution of AITF cost depends on two factors: botnet growth
and the fall of DRAM price; as long as the former does not
outpace the latter, AITF cost is not expected to rise.
DRAM price has consistently been dropping to half every
18 months for the last 30 years. Assuming it continues to
fall at this rate, AITF cost is not expected to increase, unless
botnet-size growth outpaces Moore’s law—i.e., in 15 years
from now, there are botnets consisting of tens of millions of
hosts. In this unfortunate situation, either the cost of AITF
will rise, or receivers will have to aggregate undesired traffic
more aggressively, at the cost of sacrificing a certain amount
of legitimate traffic.
VII. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we use simulation to analyze the effect of
undesired traffic on AITF-enabled receivers and illustrate the
effectiveness of AITF against bandwidth flooding.
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A. Simulation Framework
The goal of our simulation was to illustrate not only the
tail-circuit capacity loss (which is computed at the granu-
larity of a filtering window), but also the burstiness of the
undesired traffic within each filtering window. To capture
the short-term dynamics of undesired traffic, we needed our
simulation to work at the granularity of individual sources
and bottleneck links. None of the existing network-simulation
packages allowed us to simulate attacks from tens to hundreds
of thousands of sources at such granularity, which led us to
create our own framework.
In the beginning of each simulation, we create a set of
interconnected (core and edge) border routers—to create a
realistic topology, we used BGP routing tables from Route
Views [18] and applied to them Gao’s algorithm for inferring
inter-AS relationships [19]. We also create a set of sources
randomly distributed behind edge routers and one receiver.
We interconnect neighbor domains through OC-48 and OC-
192 full-duplex links; we also connect each edge router
to its hosts, through Fast (100 Mbps) or Thin (10 Mbps)
Ethernet full-duplex links. End-to-end round-trip times average
200 milliseconds, while host-to-edge router round-trip times
average 10 milliseconds.
For our simulation scenarios, we use the parameters of
Table IV unless otherwise noted. We assume that preventing
stamping is used to drop all spoofed traffic (§IV-C), while
source gateways cooperate and block misbehaving sources.
B. Initial Overhead
1) Deaf Sources: We first simulate a 1-Gbps SYN-flooding
attack from 100 000 deaf sources; the receiver identifies each
source after receiving one second’s worth of traffic from
it (about 20 SYN packets). Fig. 3 shows the outcome: all
undesired flows are blocked within 100 seconds, at which point
the target has received about 9.5 Gbits of initial overhead
(1 Gbit of identification overhead and 8.5 Gbits of request
overhead). In this case, the initial overhead does not reach
the upper bound of Eq. 1 for the two reasons stated in §V-C:
first, the receiver identifies undesired flows and sends filtering
requests in parallel; second, about 90 seconds after the start of
the attack, there aren’t enough undesired flows left unblocked
to flood the receiver’s tail circuit.
2) Lying Sources: Next, we simulate an attack with the
same parameters, but coming from lying sources. Fig. 4 shows
the outcome: each source sends three rounds of undesired
traffic—one round in the beginning of the attack, a second
Parameter Value
Tail-circuit capacity Ctc = 100 Mbps
Round-trip time across tail circuit RTTtc = 10 milliseconds
Outbound filtering request rate REQout = 1000 requests/second
Filtering window Wf = 10 minutes
Number of sources Nuf = 100 000 flows
Aggregate undesired-traffic rate Rut = 1 Gbps
Identification overhead Bid = 1 Gbit
Identification time Tid = 1 second
TABLE IV
DEFAULT SIMULATION PARAMETERS
round after the corresponding source gateway has removed
its temporary filter for the first time, and a third round after
the gateway has removed its temporary filter for the second
time. Once the source has violated the filtering request against
it twice, it is identified as lying and blocked by its gateway.
Until all sources are blocked, the target receives about 29 bits
of initial overhead (1 Gbit of identification overhead and 28
Gbits of request overhead). Note that each source sends three
rounds of undesired traffic (rather than four, as dictated by
Eq. 2); this is because the equation was derived assuming the
worst-case scenario, where source gateways do not cooperate,
whereas, in this case, the source gateways do cooperate and
block lying sources once these are exposed.
C. Tail-circuit Capacity Loss
1) Non-coordinated On-off Sources: Our next scenario is
an attack with the same parameters, but coming from on-
off sources. These sources are “non-coordinated”: they co-
operate with filtering requests, and each one resumes sending
undesired traffic as soon as the filtering request against it has
expired. The outcome is shown in Fig. 5: during the first fil-
tering window, the attack looks exactly the same with the one
from deaf sources; after that, undesired flows reappear every
filtering window and are re-blocked, wasting λ = 0.00167 of
the target’s tail-circuit capacity.
An interesting point is that the undesired traffic received
during the first filtering window is more than the undesired
traffic received during subsequent windows. The explanation
is the following: In the beginning of the attack, undesired
flows arrive at the receiver’s tail circuit in bursts; the receiver’s
filtering-request rate is not enough to block each undesired
flow as soon as it is identified—it takes 100 seconds to
block all identified flows; in the meantime, the receiver incurs
significant request overhead. After the first filtering window,
however, sources resume as soon as the corresponding filtering
requests have expired, which means that undesired flows
reappear at the rate at which they were blocked; as a result,
the receiver does have enough filtering-request quota to block
each undesired flow as soon as it is identified; hence, it avoids
the request overhead and incurs only the identification and
(negligible) blocking overhead. In this way, the burstiness of
the attack is diluted after the first filtering window.
2) Number of Sources and Burstiness: Given a certain ag-
gregate undesired-traffic rate (Rut ) and identification overhead
(Bid ), the burstiness of an attack depends on how the undesired
traffic is distributed among different flows: the higher the
amount of per-flow traffic, the higher the burstiness of the
attack. To demonstrate this, we simulate a flooding attack of
the same rate and identification overhead as in the previous
scenario, but involving fewer (10 000) flows, each one sending
at a higher rate (100 Kbps). Fig. 6 shows the outcome: because
there are less flows, it takes less time (10 seconds) to have all
of them blocked; however, because each flow has a higher rate,
the target’s tail circuit is flooded in the beginning of every
filtering window. So, relative to the previous scenario, the
receiver incurs the same tail-circuit capacity loss (0.00167);
however, all the overhead occurs within 10 seconds, making
this a burstier attack.
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Fig. 3. Flooding attack from deaf sources. Nuf = 100 000 flows;
Rut = 1 Gbps. The first 10 000 flows arrive at the tail circuit at
t = 0; every time a flow is blocked, a new one takes its place, until
all flows are blocked. The target identifies each flow after receiving
it for 1 second, hence, it sends its first filtering requests at t = 1
second. It takes Treq = NufREQout = 100 seconds to send filtering
requests against all flows, hence, the attack is blocked at t = 101
seconds. The total amount of undesired traffic received is B ≈ 9.5
Gbits, of which 1 Gbit is identification overhead and 8.5 Gbits are
request overhead; the blocking overhead is negligible.
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Fig. 4. Flooding attack from lying sources. Nuf = 100 000 flows;
Rut = 1 Gbps. As in Fig. 3, at time t = 101 seconds each undesired
flow has been blocked at least once. Each source resumes sending
twice—until it is classified as lying and blocked. Hence, the receiver
ends up sending 3Nuf = 300 000 filtering requests, which takes 300
seconds. The total amount of undesired traffic received is B ≈ 29
Gbits—1 Gbit of identification overhead and 28 Gbits of request
overhead.
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Fig. 5. Flooding attack from non-coordinated on-off sources. Nuf =
100 000 flows; Rut = 1 Gbps. As in Fig. 3, at time t = 101
seconds all undesired flows have been blocked for the first time.
Each source resumes exactly Wf = 10 minutes after it is blocked;
as a result, undesired flows reappear every Wf = 10 minutes at
rate REQout = 1000 flows/second, and get blocked at that same
rate. After the first filtering window, the receiver incurs only the 1-
Gbit identification overhead every Wf = 10 minutes; the tail-circuit
capacity loss is λ = 0.00167.
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Fig. 6. Burstier flooding attack from non-coordinated on-off sources.
Nuf = 10 000 flows; Rut = 1 Gbps. The target identifies each flow
after receiving it for 10 seconds, hence, it sends its first filtering
requests at t = 11 seconds. It takes Treq = NufREQout = 10 seconds to
send filtering requests against all flows, hence, the attack is blocked
for the first time at t = 21 seconds. After the first filtering window,
the receiver incurs the 1-Gbit identification overhead every Wf = 10
minutes. Compared to Fig. 5, the recurring overhead is the same
(λ = 0.00167), but it is inflicted in 10 (rather than 100) seconds.
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Fig. 7. Flooding attack from coordinated on-off sources. Nuf =
100 000 flows; Rut = 1 Gbps. As in Fig. 3 and 5, at time t =
101 seconds all undesired flows have been blocked for the first
time. The first 10 000 sources resume as soon as the first 10 000
filtering requests have expired, which happens 10 seconds after the
first filtering request expires, i.e., at t = 611 seconds; the rest of the
sources resume as early as they are allowed. As a result, undesired
flows recreate the initial attack pattern every 611 minutes. The tail-
circuit capacity loss is λ = 0.17.
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Fig. 8. Flooding attack from coordinated on-off sources with
distributed filtering window. Nuf = 100 000 flows; Rut = 1
Gbps. The filtering window is uniformly distributed from 5 to 15
minutes. Sources resume in groups of 10 000, as soon as enough
filtering requests have expired, i.e., every 75 seconds. It takes
Treq =
Nuf
REQout
= 10 seconds to have 10 000 flows blocked, hence,
each group periodically induces a 10-second spike. Compared to
Fig. 7, the recurring overhead is the same (λ = 0.17), but it consists
of 10-second (rather than 100-second) spikes.
3) Coordinated On-off Sources: We simulate, once again,
a 1-Gbps SYN-flooding attack from 100 000 on-off sources.
These sources, however, are “coordinated”: they cooperate
with filtering requests, then resume their attack in groups,
such that each group can send enough to flood the receiver’s
tail circuit. As a result, they periodically re-inflict the initial
overhead (including the request overhead). Fig. 7 shows the
outcome: the sources recreate the initial attack burst every 610
seconds; tail-circuit capacity loss is λ = 0.17.
4) Varying Filtering Window: An intuitive conclusion from
the last simulation is that, if an attack can cause certain damage
to the receiver’s tail circuit once, it can inevitably do so
again, as long as the participating sources wait long enough
so they can attack with the same burstiness. This led us to
the following observation: during an attack from coordinated
on-off sources, what matters to the attacker is not how early
each individual flow can resume, but how early each group of
flows can resume; if the receiver associates a different window
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with each filtering request (so the average is Wf ), then the
participating sources must on average wait longer in order to
achieve the same level of burstiness.
To demonstrate this, we simulate an attack with the same
parameters as in the previous scenario, during which the
receiver uses a uniformly distributed filtering window with
an average of Wf = 10 minutes. Fig. 8 shows the outcome of
the attack when sources wait until they can resume in groups
of 10 000 (just enough to flood the target’s tail circuit): not
surprisingly, the tail-circuit capacity loss is the same as in the
previous scenario (λ = 0.17), but the overhead is distributed in
10-second spikes every 75 seconds (rather than a 100-second
outage every 610 seconds).
We do not address the issue of determining the optimal
filtering-window distribution or the worst type of attack, but
we believe that it depends on the particular type of service
offered by the receiver. For example, a web server may handle
the 10-second spikes better: each spike consumes more than
80% of the tail circuit roughly for two seconds; TCP retrans-
mission may allow the short HTTP flows to recover from
losses incurred during these two seconds. On the contrary,
a server that expects its legitimate flows to exceed 75 seconds
(e.g., a movie database), may handle the 100-second outages
better: if it knows when to expect the next outage, it can refuse
to serve any requests expected to complete during or after the
outage and prompt its clients to retry a few minutes later.
VIII. DISCUSSION
A. Request-channel Flooding
Any solution to bandwidth flooding that involves a “request
channel” faces the challenge of becoming itself a bandwidth-
flooding target. In our case, the request channel is the path
from the receiver to the source gateway; we now discuss to
what extent an attacker can flood this path and interfere with
AITF operation.
1) Upstream-channel Flooding: So far, we have considered
the scenario where an attacker floods receiver R’s downstream
connection, while R still controls its upstream connection and
can send filtering requests. However, if the attacker controls
a host located close to R (e.g., behind the same Ethernet
hub), it can also flood R’s upstream connection to its gateway,
preventing R from sending filtering requests (or any traffic).
This scenario is possible only if the attacker has access to
R’s upstream connection to its gateway—unlikely if R is a
professional public-access site, but plausible if it is a server
residing in a home or campus network. To handle such “insider
attacks,” AITF would have to be adapted to work at the intra-
domain level: the router that controls the flooded bottleneck
link from R to Rgw should be able to detect the flood and
make the corresponding internal source stop.
2) Source-gateway Flooding: An attacker may try to flood
the tail circuit to source gateway Sgw , in an effort to prevent
it from receiving legitimate filtering requests, so that it gets
classified as non-cooperating, potentially losing its commu-
nications. This attack corresponds to bandwidth-flooding an
Internet border router, so it requires more resources from the
attacker’s side than flooding a simple receiver. In any case,
AITF handles this like any other bandwidth-flooding attack:
Sgw becomes the complaining receiver and sends (to its own
gateway) filtering requests, which are eventually propagated
to the undesired-traffic sources.
3) Receiver-gateway Flooding: Finally, an attacker may try
to flood the tail circuit to the receiver’s gateway Rgw , in an
effort to prevent it from completing any three-way handshakes
with source gateways. Indeed, if an attacker causes congestion
on Rgw ’s tail circuit, Rgw cannot operate correctly as a
receiver’s gateway. However, AITF is based on the principle
that the highest upstream entity affected by the attack acts
as the “receiver”—so, if Rgw ’s tail circuit is flooded, Rgw
acts as the “receiver” and sends filtering requests to its own
“receiver’s gateway” upstream.
B. Filtering Costs Versus Collateral Damage
Filtering undesired traffic per source and destination address
in the long term (i.e., for the duration of the attack, which
may last hours or days) is not a sustainable solution: as
botnet sizes increase, each receiver may get undesired traffic
from hundreds of thousands, even millions of sources; and
as attacks become more sophisticated, each source may send
undesired traffic to equally large numbers of receivers. Hence,
whether the filtering is done at the receiver’s or the source’s
network, we expect long-term selective filtering to become
increasingly expensive—certainly beyond the capabilities of
current networks with a few thousand filters per client.
AITF avoids long-term selective filtering by blocking traffic
from non-cooperating entities (sources or networks) with ag-
gregate filters that block multiple undesired flows at a time; the
catch is that aggregate filters may affect the legitimate traffic
generated by the non-cooperating entities. This approach may
annoy users/administrators that will now lose part or all of
their network connectivity until they clean up their compro-
mised equipment; on the other hand, it provides a strong
incentive to them to keep their equipment clean or else risk
reduced network connectivity.
By default, AITF blocks all traffic from a non-cooperating
source with a single aggregate filter (this policy minimizes
the resources spent on misbehaving clients). However, each
provider can define its own policy, e.g., it can agree to filter
up to N aggregates from each non-cooperating client. A
harsh policy (a small N ) is likely to dissatisfy the owners of
compromised machines; a lenient policy (a large N ) is more
client-friendly, but also more expensive, as it commits multiple
filters to each non-cooperating client; finally, an “indifferent”
policy (i.e., ignoring filtering requests) is both client-friendly
and inexpensive, yet it bears the risk of losing connectivity
to the complaining receivers and dissatisfying the legitimate
clients that were communicating with them. Similar trade-offs
are involved when a receiver chooses a policy toward non-
cooperating source gateways.
We do not explore these trade-offs as part of this work,
but we believe that they should be resolved separately for
each receiver and/or provider, taking into account the type
of their business, potentially differentiating between more and
less important (business-wise) clients and/or domains.
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IX. RELATED WORK
Bandwidth flooding belongs to the wider topic of denial of
service (DoS), which covers source-address spoofing, attack
detection, undesired-traffic identification, and application-level
attacks that target server resources like memory or CPU; even
though all that work is related to ours (in the sense that they
complement each other), we do not discuss it here, in favor of
a deeper comparison of AITF to more closely related work.
Overlay-based solutions protect a receiver from flooding by
restricting its communications to a set of authorized sources;
to prevent the authentication process from becoming itself a
DoS target, it is outsourced to a set of access points connected
to the receiver through an overlay network [11], [20], [21].
In contrast, AITF addresses the more general problem of
protecting public-access sites—receivers that do not know in
advance which sources they want to receive traffic from, while
sources can become compromised at any point in time and start
sending undesired traffic. Moreover, AITF does not require
protected receivers to trust any entities other than the routers
that are already on the path of their communications.
Pushback enables a receiver to identify the last-hop routers
that forward to it high-rate traffic and ask them to rate-limit
all traffic addressed to it; this process is repeated recursively
at each router, so that rate-limiting of undesired-traffic is
eventually pushed closer to its sources [22]. Rate limiting
prevents congestion on the target’s tail circuit (and, hence,
protects traffic addressed to other receivers sharing the same
tail circuit), but does not protect the target’s legitimate traffic
during distributed attacks: when the rate limiting happens at
interfaces receiving a mix of legitimate and undesired traffic
addressed to the target (as is expected to happen during
distributed attacks), legitimate traffic still ends up competing
with undesired traffic for the target’s tail-circuit capacity, even
if this “competition” is pushed outside the target’s tail circuit—
and we have already mentioned that legitimate TCP flows fare
poorly in such situations. To our knowledge, Pushback offers
the best result that can be achieved without assuming any anti-
spoofing or undesired-traffic identification mechanisms.
Similar to AITF, the Points of Control approach (developed
concurrently) selectively blocks undesired traffic before the
receiver’s tail circuit, at ISP boundaries [8]; its fundamental
difference from AITF is that traffic is blocked in the long term
by wire-speed filters (the issue of an ISP not having enough
filters is not addressed). In general, the Points of Control
proposal focuses more on the issues of providing a separate
address space for publicly addressable servers and performing
wire-speed encapsulation, whereas this paper focused on a
filtering protocol with well characterized scalability properties.
More recent, clean-slate proposals suggest that receivers
directly contact undesired-traffic sources and ask them to stop;
they rely on sources being enhanced with uncompromisable
functionality (e.g., running on NIC firmware) that verifies and
satisfies such requests [23], [24]. The Accountable Internet
Protocol, moreover, equips all packets with self-certifying,
unspoofable addresses [24], which enables elegant bandwidth-
flooding solutions—no need for extra measures against source-
address, path, or filtering-request spoofing. This reduced com-
plexity, however, relies on clean-slate elements (a new Internet
protocol, new NICs), whereas our proposal aims for incremen-
tal deployment on top of the current Internet.
Network capabilities enable a receiver to deny by default all
traffic and explicitly accept traffic from identified legitimate
sources [25]. The key feature of capability-based filtering,
introduced in the SIFF proposal [26], is that it is stateless
and, hence, obviates the need for wire-speed filters in routers
and inter-ISP filtering agreements (because no filtering state
is explicitly exchanged between ISPs). On the other hand,
capability-based solutions face a significant challenge: to pro-
tect the capability-setup channel itself from flooding [27]. This
challenge brings to mind public-key infrastructures, where the
greatest deployment issue has proved to be not the encryption
of the data, but the management and distribution of the keys.
One proposal for protecting the capability-setup channel is
to fair-queue capability requests per incoming router inter-
face [28]. This approach faces a similar challenge with Push-
back: when the fair queuing happens at interfaces receiving a
mix of legitimate and undesired capability requests, legitimate
requests end up competing with (and losing to) undesired ones,
even if this “competition” is pushed away from the target’s
tail circuit [27]. Another proposal is to combine capabilities
with stateful filtering, i.e., explicitly block capability requests
from specific sources [29]; in contrast, AITF was designed to
introduce as few new mechanisms as possible—if capabilities
alone are not enough and we have to use stateful filtering
anyway, why not design a protocol that uses only stateful
filtering? A third proposal is Portcullis, where capability
distribution is regulated through special “puzzles,” distributed
over the Domain Name Service (DNS). This approach relies
on the assumption that the DNS infrastructure is itself pro-
tected from flooding through over-provisioning and/or other
dedicated infrastructure [30]; in contrast, AITF consists of
a single mechanism, suitable for protecting any bandwidth-
flooding target—including the DNS infrastructure.
At a higher level, network capabilities take the “connection-
oriented” approach, where the network only allows (or gives
priority to) traffic that belongs to explicitly established connec-
tions. This approach has been showed to work in the context of
a single administrative domain (e.g., an enterprise or campus
network), where connection authorization can be performed
centrally, based on predefined access policies [31]. However,
in the Internet context, where receivers from one domain
are expected to authorize sources from another, an important
missing piece in evaluating the connection-oriented approach
is answering the following fundamental question: what is a
reasonable number of bytes and a reasonable amount of time to
allow an unknown source, which could become compromised
at any point in time? While it is worth investigating this
question, it is also worth considering the alternative, “data-
gram” approach, where a receiver explicitly denies undesired
traffic, while accepting, by default, all other traffic; to the best
of our knowledge, the work we presented here is the first
that proposes a datagram-based filtering solution that requires
a credible, bounded amount of resources from participating
ISPs and addresses the security issues that arise from filter
propagation across different administrative domains.
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X. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented Active Internet Traffic Filtering, a
network-layer filtering mechanism that preserves a significant
fraction of a receiver’s tail circuit in the face of bandwidth
flooding, while requiring a reasonable amount of resources
from participating ISPs.
We have showed that: (1) AITF allows a receiver to preserve
on average 80% of its tail circuit in the face of a SYN-
flooding attack that has ten times the rate of its capacity.
(2) Each participating ISP needs a few thousand filters and
a few megabytes of DRAM per client; the per-client cost is
not expected to increase, unless botnet-size growth outpaces
Moore’s law. (3) The first two AITF-enabled networks can
maintain their communication in the face of flooding attacks,
as long as the path between them is not compromised.
The feasibility of AITF shows that the network-layer of the
Internet can provide an effective, scalable, and incrementally
deployable solution to bandwidth-flooding attacks.
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